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Summary findings
China's two main cconomic problems  before reform  in transition  from central  planning chat based their
were  low incentives to workers and  the misallocation of  development on the rapid growth  of heavy industry.
resources among sectors. These problems  werc the  result  China's approach  may be of interest to them. Among
of a development  strategy oriented toward  heavy  lessons China learned  are that:
industry.  - Autonomy  must be granted  to micromanagement
By improving material incentives, China's  reforms  units and preserved  to improve  the incentive structure
created a flow of new resources and allowed them to be  and create a new flow of resources.
allocated  to sectors suppressed  under pre-reform  While  maintaining essential minimum levels' of
strategies.  production  in the pre-reform  priority sectors,
The onset  of reform  in China was not allowed to  autonomous  enterprises  must be permitted  and
disrupt production  from  exisring resources.  Instead, the  encouraged  ro allocate  new incremental  resource flows
newly  created  resources were permitted  to  accrue and to  to the previously suppressed sectors.
flow into the more productive,  often light industrial  *  [n parallel,  the distorted  policy environment  and
sectors,  thus stimulating  continuous  growth  of the  planned-allocation  system must be progressively
national  economy during  reform.  reformed to bring  them into line with the new system of
Low incentives and  the suppression  of nonpriority  incentives and modus operandi  of autonomous
sectors are common  features of the legacy of economies  enterprises.
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INTRODUCTION
There are two  distinct approaches recommended for the transition from a centrally-
planned to  a decentralized, market economy. The first approach is known as the "big bang"'.
or  "shock  therapy"  (Lipton  and  Sachs,  19901.  It  advocates  economic  stabilization,
liberalization and privatization as necessary components of  economic reform- As in divine
creation  which  lasted  only  seven days, this  approach encourages completing  all these
measures within a relatively short period of time. The reforms recently undertaken in Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union are prime examples of this strategy.
The  contrasting  alternative  is  called the  "gradual",  "organic"  or  "evolutionary"
approach [Kornai 1  990), and it characterizes the reform process that  China has undergone.
This approach is partial, incremental, sequential and often experimental. It does not pursue
large-scale privatization.  As  a method of  decentralization,  it  is  widely  regarded as self-
defeating by at least part of the economic profession. In contrast, the first approach has been
judged to  be theoretically  rigorous and feasible in practice  (Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny,
1992).
During the transition,  economic "shock  therapy"  is expected to  generate a J-curve
effect on growth. GNP may decline initially but should soon be followed by a strong recovery.
When administered in Eastem Europe  and the former Soviet Union, however, this combination
of radical and abrupt change has resulted in an unexpectedly sharp and prolonged decline in
GNP. This has been accompanied by extraordinarily high inflation rates (see Table 1) l
The collapse of international trade due to the demise of CMEA has also contributed to
the decline of GNP in these countries. Nonetheless, the "shock therapy" was undoubtedly a
major cause of their spiral downward  (Brada and King, 1991)..4
Table  1: Growth  and Inflation  in Eastern Europe and  the  former  Soviet  Un4on
Real  GDP  Retail  Price
(Percentage  Change)  (Percentage  Change)
88  B9  90  91  92-  93  B8  89  90  91  92  93
Country  (est.)  (est.)
Albania  . -30  -8  3  36  200  130
Armenia  -12  -50  -10  100  1350  na
Azerbaijan  -2  -30  -10  138  1350  na
Belarus  . -3  -11  -3  . 80  1076  1300
Bulgaria  .3  -2  -9  -12  -8  -5  2  6  26  334  83  90
Croat:-ia  -29  -11  -5  123  664  790
Czechoslovakia  3  1  -1  -14  -7  na  0  2  11  . 57  11  20
EstonLa  -13  -26  -10  212  1050  200
Georgia  -25  -30  -10  81  1800  na
Hungary  0  0  -4  -12  -S  -2  16  17  29  35  23  23
Kazakhstai  -8  -13  -15  91  1381  1000
Kyrgyzstan  -5  -25  -16  85  855  600
Latvia  -8  -44  -10  172.  951  250
Lithuania  -13  -35  -10  225  1021  . 690
Macedonia  -11  -15  -7  115.  1691  580
Noldova  -12  -2-  -15  98  1460  1000
Poland  :  0  -11  -7  1  .2  60  251  586  70  43  39
-Romania  1-  -7  -7  -14  -15  -9  3  1  7  161  210  210
Russia  - -11  -19  -15  2  6  93  1354  1000
Slovak  3  1  0  -16  -6  -8  0  2  11  61  10  25
Slovenia  - - -r  -1  15S  207  47
Tajikistan  -9  -32  -18  103  1450  na
Turkmenistan  -7  -12  -9  90  980  na
Ukraine  2  4  -4  -14  -14  -10  0  2  4  91  1450  1450
Uzbekistan  . -1  -14  -10  82  700  na
Source:  The  Economics  of  Transition,  vol.  1,  no.  3  (September  1993):  pp.  370-378.-
The situation  could  not  have  been  more  different  in China.  Reform  there  began  at  the
end  of  1978.  Since  then,  GNP has  grown  at  phenomenally  high  rates  while  prices  have
remained  relatively  stable  (see  Figure  1).  Whether  China's  reforms  provide  any  general
implications  for  other  reforming  economies  is the  subject  of lively debate.  Several  economists
argue  that  China's  success  poses  a  challenge  to  the  conventional  wisdom  that  stabilization,
liberalization  and  privatization  are  key  to  successful  reform  (McMillan  and  Naughton,  1992;
Singh  1 991;  Chen etal,  1992;  Harrold  1992;  Perkins  1992;  McKinnon  1993).  Theymaintain
that  China's  recent  economic  history  demonstrates  the  superiority  of  evolutionary,experimental and bottom-up reform over the comprehensive, top-down reforms advocated bV
the  first  approach.
A  third  school  argues  that  it  is neither  gradualism  nor  experimentation that  has
contributed to  rapid growth  in China.  Instead, they  cite its initial structure,  namely, a labor
force largely concentrated in agriculture where productivity  is low,  as the relevant  factor  in
its economic progress.  According to this view, the key to China's success lies in a classical
process of economic development - the transfer of workers from low-productivity agriculture
to  industry,  where productivity  is higher. These traditionalists  claim that  such a process
cannot be duplicated in Eastern Europe  and the former Soviet Union, due to the much smaller
percentage of their respective labor forces which  are employed in agriculture.
In this paper we attempt to provide a new  perspective.  The  economic problems in
China and other formerly Socialist economies were the low level of incentives to workers and
the  misallocation  of  resources  among sectors.  These  resulted  from  the  extraordinary
development emphasis given to heavy industry  during the pre-reform periods.
'Shock  therapy"  attempts  to  provide  an institutional  framework  that  will  improve
incentives ar,d induce the shift of part of the existing stock of resources from sectors of low
productivity  to more productive areas. However, shifting resources from one use to another
is costly,  and the establishment of new institutions  requires time,  energy and other inputs
(Murrel and Wang, 1993). Thus, we agree  that a J-curve, or worse an L-curve, is unavoidable
if this approach is adopted. Nonetheless, China's experience illustrates that prolonged drops
in income are not in'evitably a consequence of initiating a transition-6
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Figure 1: Economic Growth and Inflation in China7
Instead of  attempting  to  reallocate the  existing  stock  of  resources from  a low-
productivity  sector to more highly productive sectors, China's reforms created a flow  of new
resources. They did so by improving the material incentives, and allowing the newly created
flow  of resources to  be allocated to sectors which  had been suppressed under the original
emphasis on heavy industry. Because production of the existing stock of resources was not
disrupted, and the new flow  of resources was allocated to economic sectors demonstrating-
a comparative advantage 7 the J-curve effect of the more static approach  was avoided. China's
national economy has enjoyed continuous growth  throughout the reform process. Since low
incentives and the suppression of non-priority sectors are common features to all economies
adopting a development strategy favoring heavy industry, China's approach may have general
implications for  other economies with similar strategies.
This  paper  is  organized into  four  parts.  Section  I discusses  China's  economic
development strategy prior to reform and presents a simple economic model to analyze  the
problems associated with the development strategy.  Section II provides an analytical review
of China's reforms. China's approach to reform is compared with the shock therapy approach
in Section IlIl. Concluding remarks follow  in the last section.
I.  MAJOR PRE-REFORM  PROBLEMS  IN THE CHINESE  ECONOMY
The traditional  economic structure in China was shaped by the adoption in the early
1  950s  of a development strategy oriented towards  heavy industry.  At the founding of the
People's Republic in  1949,  the  new  government  inherited  a war-torn  agrarian economy.
Eighty-nine percent of  the population resided in rural areas. Industry comprised only  1  2.68
percent of national income. At that time, a well-developed heavy industry sector was regarded
as a symbol  of national power and economic achievement. Like the leadership in India and
many  other  newly  independent  countries.  Chinese  leaders intended  to  accelerate its
development.
The  Soviet  Union's  outstanding  record  of  economic growth  during  the  1930s
contrasted with the-Great Depression, which dominated Western market economies at that
time. It provided the Chinese leadership with both inspiration and experience, paving the way
for  acceptance of  a development strategy  favoring  heavy  industry. Thus in  1953,  after
recovery from wartime destruction,  the government identified heavy industry as the priority
sector. The objective was to build up as rapidly as possible the country's capacity to produce
capital  goods and military materials. This development strategy  wvas  to  be further  defined
through a series of five-year plans.
The system had three interrelated components: (1) a macro-policy environment which
featured  artificially  low  interest rates,  an overvalued exchange rate,  low  wage rates and
controlled price levels for basic necessities and raw materials; (2) planned allocation of credit,
foreign  exchange  and  other  resources;  and  (3)  a  micro-management system  of  state
enterprises and collectivized agriculture. These three components were logically dictated by
the choice of a development strategy pniortizing  heavy industry in an agrarian economy where
capital is scarce. The relationship between the development strategy in the period of central
planning and the economic structure is summarized in Figure 2.
Heavy industry  is  a capital  intensive  sector,  characterized by  lumpy  and slowly
gestating  investments. Heavy industrial investment  projects can take ten years or more to
complete. Further, much project equipment, at least in the initial stages, needs  to be imported
from more advanced economies.9
In the early 1  950s, the availability of capital in China was limited, and consequently.
market  interest  rates  were  high.'  Foreign exchange  was  scarce since  there  were  few
exportable goods (primarily low-priced agricultural products). The economic surplus was small
and dispersed due to the agrarian nature of  the economy. These features of the  Chinese
economy  were  poorly  matched to  the  requirements  of  projects  in  heavy  industry,  and
spontaneous development of capital-intensive industry was nearly impossible. 3 To develop
it  would  demand a set  of  macroeconomic policies that  effectively  distorted  the  existing
structure and redirected resource flows  in accordance with  planners' norms rather than the
dictates of expected profitability.
Therefore, at the beginning of the first five year plan (1  952). the Chinese  government
imposed low  interest  rate policies and overvalued exchange rates to  reduce the  costs of
interest  payments and the importation  of equipment.4 In order to  secure enough funds to
accelerate industrial expansion, a policy of low input prices  -including  wage rates for workers
and prices for raw materials, energy and transportation  - also evolved as the heavy industry
strategy deepened. 3 The assumption was that  low prices would enable an enterprise to
2 Three percent per month was a normal interest rate atthat  time in the informal financial
markets. This is equivalent to an annual rate of 36 percent.
3  The prevailing high interest rates eroded the profitability  of  any long-term investment
undertaking.  Moreover,  since  most  equipment  needed to  be  imported  from  advanced
countries, the limited supply of foreign exchange made the construction of heavy industry
doubly expensive due to the market-determined exchanoe rate for foreign currency. Lastly,
because  the agricultural surplus was small and scattered, it was difficult to mobilize sufficient
internal savings for major lump-sum investments.
For example, the interest rate on bank loans was officially set at about five percent per
year. On a investment of $1 at the beginning of a 10 year project, the principal and interest
payments at the time that the project was completed would be only $1.6.
5 The wage rate  in the  early 1950s  most  likely  was not underpriced because of  the
competition  between the state  enterprises and  private  enterprises. However, the private
enterprises were soon nationalized. Once the state became  the sole employer, it was able toFigure  2:  The  Formation  of  the Traditional  Economic  Structure in  China
Exogenous  Develooment  StrateAy  Endogenous  Economic  Structure  EConomfc  Performance
and  Economic  Endowments
Heavy-Industry-  Distorted  Macro-Policy  Environment  Planned Allocation  Structurat  Imbalance
Oriented  Development  System
Strategy  Low  Interest-Rate  Policy
. Overvalued  Exchange-Rate  Policy
Low  Input-Price  Policy
Capital-Scarce  Low  Wage-Rate  Policy  Micro-Management  System  Low  Technical  Efficiency
Agrarian  Low  Living-Necessity  Price  PoLicy  ._  L  -ctes
Economy  Puppet-like  State  Enterprises
CoLleitive  Farms
depress  wage rates. As a result, although real GNP  per capita tripled between 1952 and
1978, the real  wage  rate  was kept almost  constant,  increasing  only 10.3 percent,  during  the
same  period  (China  State Statistical  Yearbook  1987, p. 151).create profits sufficient to repay its loans, and to accumulate enough funds for reinvestment.
However, if the enterprise were privately owned, the state could not be sure  that the private
entrepreneur would invest the  subsidized profits  in the targeted  project. To mitigate this
tension, private enterprises  were soon nationalized.' New key enterprises were entirely state-
owned, which secured governmental.  control  over nominal profits in the new industries.  To
ensure that  the  low  wage  policy would  be feasible,  the government was also obliged to
provide urban residents with  inexpensive food  and other  necessities, including housing,
medical care and clothing.
This distorted environment created dramatic imbala.-ces in the supply and demand of
credits, foreign  exchange, raw materials and other  basic necessities. Non-priority sectors
would have competed with heavy industry to satisfy the excess demand associated  with price
rationing  in fragmented markets. Therefore, markets as a mechanism for allocating scarce
resources had to be replaced with plans, targets and administrative controls on the allocation
and use of limited resources. Additionally, the state monopolized banks, foreign trade and the
material distribution  systems in order to suppress competition  and inhibit "leakage". 7
- 6- Under the New Democracy Policy adopted by the Communist party in the late 1940s,
private enterprise was supposed to coexist with the state-owned enterprises  for an extended:
period of time after the revolution. However, enterprises were rapidly nationalized in 1952
when the. government first attempted to secure profits for  projects in heavy industry as the
.heavy  industry oriented development strategy was being adopted.
7  In  the  literature,  many  authors  equate  the  distorted  policy  environment  and the
administrative controls with socialism. However, from the above discussion we find that the
rationale for the  existence of these policies and controls was not  "socialism."  Rather, the
distorted  macro-policy  environment  and planned allocation  system  arose because of the
adoption of a heavy industry oriented strategy in a capital-scarce economy. All the socialist
economies  had similar policy  environments  and  administrative  controls  because they  all
adopted the same development strategy, probably under the influence of Stalin. Even  some
non-socialist  developing  economies, such  as India, imposed similar policies and controls
because they  also  pursued the  same development: strategies  grounded  in  accelerated
industrialization.-12
Profits  ceased  to be a measure  of an enterprise's  efficiency.  Furthermore,  because  of
the lack of market  discipline, managerial  discretion was potentially a serious problem. It was
severely  curtailed to eliminate  any possibility of undiscipline or disruption. 8 Sta;.- enterprises
were  subject  to mandatory  production plans  and were furnished with most of their material
inputs. Prices  of their products  were determined by pricing authorities. Government agencies
controlled the circulation of products from producers  to users  and consumers.  Workers' wages
and managers' salaries  conformed to a national wage scale. Investment and working capital
were financed principally through grants from  the state budget or loans from the banking
system, in accordance with the state plans. The enterprises remitted all profits made to the
state budgetary agency. In return, the agency covered all losses incurred by the enterprises. 9
In essence, the state enterprises  were puppets of central authorities. They did not have any
autonomy over employment, the use of profits,  their production plans, material supp:ies or
product marketing.
The development  strategy and resulting policy environment and allocation system also
shaped the evolution of farming in China. In order to secure cheap supplies of grain and other
agricultural products for rationing in urban centers, in 1953 a compulsory procurement  policy
was imposed in rural areas. The policy obliged peasant farmers to sell certain quantities of
their produce, including grain, cotton and edible oli, to the state at prices which it had set.
In addition to providing cheap  food for industrialization, agriculture was the main earner
of foreign exchange. In the 1  950s, agricultural products alone comprised over 40 percent of
8  China's state enterprises were granted some autonomy after the reforms of the late
1  970s. As expected, one of the results of this move was a rapid increase  in wages, bonuses
and fringe benefits, which came at the expense of enterprise profits.
9  Before the reforms, there were some collective enterprises  in the urban areas.  They were
managed no differently than the state-owned enterprises, other than being treated as less
experienced partners.1  3
all exports.  If processed agricultural products  are also counted, agriculture contributed more
than 60 percent of China's foreign exchange earnings up until the 1970s. Foreign exchange
was a constraint  as important as capital to the strategy to develop heavy industry. Thus, in
the  early  stages  of  development,  the  country's  capacity  to  import  capital  goods  for
industrialization clearly depended  on agriculture's  performance.
Agricultural  development  requires  resources  and  investment  just  as  industrial
development does. The government, however, was reluctant to divert scarce resources and
funds from industry to agriculture. Its strategy to develop agriculture would not compete for
resources with  industrial  expansion. The  core  of  this  strategy  involved  plans for  mass
mobilization of the rural population to  work on labor-intensive investment projects such as
irrigation, flood  control and land reclamation. The  government also attempted to raise unit
yields through traditional methods such as closer planting, more careful weeding and the use
of greater quantities of organic fertilizer.
Collectivization  was the  institution  that  the  government  believed would  develop
agriculture. It was viewed as a convenient vehicle for  implementing the state's program to
procure grain and other agricultural products  at  low  prices. (Luo 1985).  In the collectives
income distribution  was based on each member's contribution. However, monitoring effort
is extremely difficult in agricultural production, due to its spatial and temporal dimensions. The
remuneration system in the collectives was, by default, basically egalitarian (Lin 1988).
In the Chinese economy where capital was scarce, this combination of a rigid macro-
policy environment, a planned allocation system  and micro-management of agriculture made
possible the maximum mobilization of resources for the development of heavy industry. Since
most  private  initiative  in economic activities  was  prohibited, the  pattern of  government
investment is the best indicator of the bias in the official development strategy. Table 2 shows14
the  sector  shares in state  capital  construction  investment  from  the first  five  year plan
(1953-1957)  to the  sixth five year plan (1981-85).  Despite the fact that  more than three
quarters  of  China's  population  derived  their  living  from  agriculture,  it received  less  than  10
percent of state investment in the period 1953-1985.  Meanwhile, forty-five  percent of the
investment budget went  into heavy industry. Moreover,  heavy industry received the lion's
share of  investment  falling  under the  heading  "other",  including workers'  housing and
infrastructure.  As  a result,  the  value of  the  share  represented by heavy  industry  in the
combined total of agriculture and industry grew from  1  5 percent in 1952 to about 40 percent
by the mid-1  970s  (see  Table 3).
Table 2:
Sector Shares  of State Capital  Construction Investment
rive-Year  Plan  Agricult-ure  Light  Heavv  Other
Incustrv  Industrv
(a)  ;I)  (e)  (M)
First  7.1  6.4  36.2  50-3
Second  11.3  6.4  54.0  28.3
1963-1965  17.6  3.9  45.9  32.6
Third  10.7  4.4  51.1  33.8
Fourth  9.-8  5.8  49.6  34.8
Fifth  10.5  6.7  45.9  36.9
Sixth  5.1  6.9  38.5  49-5
1953-1985  8.9  6.2  45.0  39.9
Source:  State  Statistical  Bureau,  Zhonaquo  qudinczichantouzi





Year  Agriculture  Light  Industry  Heavy  Industry
e  :  e  .
1952  56.9  27.8  15-3
1957  43.3  31.2  25.5
1962  38.8  28  9  32.3
1965  37.3  32.3  30.4
1970  33.7  30.6  35.7
1975  30.1  30.8  39.1
1980  30.8  32.6  36.6
1985  34.3  30.7  35.0
Source:  State  Statistical  Bureau,  Guomiinshouru  tor.rii  ziliao
huibiax,  p.  11.
Judging from China's sector composition, the program  of reforms has  reached  its intended
goal of accelerating  the development of heavy industry. Nonetheless,  China has paid a high
price for its achievement.  The economy is highly inefficient due to two  major problems: (1)
low allocative efficiency arising  from the deviation of the industrial  structure from the pattern
dictated by the comparative advantages in the economy; and (2) low technical efficiency
linked to the meager  incentives for workers and managers  to apply themselves and excel.
Low allocative efficiency  At the current stage of China's economic development, capital is
still relatively scarce and labor relatively abundant. If  prices were determined by market
competition, capital would be relatively expensive and labor relatively  inexpensive. Thus, the
comparative advantages of  the  Chinese economy lie  in its  labor-intensive sectors.  If
investments  were  guided  by  market  forces,  profit  incentives  would  have  induced
entrepreneurs  to adopt technologies  which demand labor but not capital, and  to allocate  more
resources to labor-intensive  industries.16
The effects on industrial structure of China's focus on developing heavy industry are
illustrated in Figure 3.
Figure 3: The Development Strategy and Truncated Production Frontier
Ught  Industiry
p :~~~~~Y  A
U  X  X 2 Xj  [1  Heavy Industry
Assume there are only two  sectors in the economy,  namely, labor-intensive light
industry  and  capital-intensive heavy  industry.  Given the  endowments,  the  production
possibility frontier is OCD[ EP represents the line of  market-determined relative prices that
exist before the imposition of the development, strategy oriented towards  heavy industry.
Under the  non-distorted  relative prices, the  economy will  produce OY'  of  light  industry
products and OX 0 of heavy industry products. However, in order to develop heavy industry,
the state monopolized the allocation system and used administrative measures  to direct the
flow of resources. Suppose light industry is limited to OY 1 so as to shift resources  from light
industry to heavy industry. The production possibility frontier is truncated to Y1AD. If there
is no technical inefficiency, the production mix of the economy will locate on A corresponding
to a quantity of  OY 1 light industry products and OX 1 heavy industry products. 10
10  Similarly, the development  of the service sector was suppressed  in order  to facilitate the
development of heavy industry. Except for grain and cotton, agriculture was also suppressed.
The government pursued  a grain self-sufficiency policy and cotton was the basic  raw material.:17
As  we  can see from  Figure  3, the  static  consequence  of  a  development  strategy
oriented  towards  heavy  industry  is that  the  economy,  based  on the prices  before  distortion,
suffers  a loss of 'ea'  in absolute  magnitude  or 'ea/eO' in relative measure."  The income loss
due  to  allocative  inefficiency  implies  the  reduction  of  surplus  available  for :investment.
Assuming  that  a fixed portion of national  income  is used  for investment,  then  the decline  in
investment  will further  diminish gross  investment.  Yet, assuming  that  the government's  plan
is to  develop  light and  heavy  industry  in a fixed  ratio of OX,IOY,, each  production  cycle will
then  repeatedly  generate  an  income  loss  of  'ea/eO'  in  relative  measure.  All these  will
significantly  dampen  the  growth  of the  whole  economy.  To maintain  the  growth  rate,  it is
necessary  to  raise the  accumulation  rate.  This  will occur  at the expense  of consumption  and
lower  living standards  over  an extended  period  of time) 2
Low technical  efficiency  Because  profits  ceased  to  be  a  measure  of- efficiency  and  the
planneo  allocation  system  often failed to distribute  materials  on time,  managers  were forced
to keep large reserves  and had no incentive  for utilizing resources  economically.  Over-staffing,
under-utilization  and  overstocking  of inventories  are  all characteristics  of puppet-like  state
:The  studies  by Desai  and Martin (1983)  and  by Whitesell and  Barreto (1 988) estimate
the  misallocation  of capital  and  labor among the  sectors  of the Soviet  economy,  which  also
adopted  the heavy-industry-oriented  development  strategy.  Desai and Martin find losses from
misallocation  in the  range  of. 3 to  10 percent-  possibly  up to  15 to  17 percent  of the inputs
employed  in  industry.  Whitesell  and  Barreto  find  that  in  the  early  1980s  output  gains
equivalent  to .4 to  6 percent  could  have been  achieved  by a reallocation  of capital  and  labor
among  the  sectors  of Soviet  industry.
t  The  average  annual  rate  of  accumulation  was  raised  from  24-2  percent  of  national
income  in the first five year  plan up to 33.0  percent  and  33.2  percent  in the fourth  and fifth
five year plans. The average  annual  growth  rate for national income  dropped from 8.9  percent
in the first five-year  plan down to 5.5  percent  and  6.1 percent  in the fourth  and fifth five-year
plans.  As a result.  wages  for state  employees  were  held almost  constant  between  the  years
1952-1978.18
enterprises." 3 Moreover,  managers  had  no authority  over  workers'  wage  rates  and bonuses.
A worker's  payment  was not  related to  his or  her effort  in the  enterprise nor  to  the
enterP rise's  profits.  The system  of remuneration  did littie to encourage  motivation.  Similarly,
in the agricultural collectives, the farmworker's  incentive to work was low because  the link
between effort and reward  was weak.'4 Losses due to this technical inefficiency mean that
actual production will locate on some point inside the production possibility frontier, such as
point B in Figure 3.
11.  ANALYTICAL  REVIEW  OF CHINA'S ECONOMIC  REFORMS
As Perkins (1988 p. 601) has pointed out,  "It is unlikely that China's leaders  had a
worked-out blueprint in mind when they set out to reform the economic structure."  Yet, in
retrospect, it is evident that China's reforms followed a logical process which can be predicted
from our theoretical model. The tripartite economic structure - the distorted macro-policy
environment,  the  planned allocation  system,  and the  puppet-like  micro-management
institutions  - was a consequence  of the adoption of a heavy industry oriented development
strategy in a capital-scarce economy. The main problems with this economic structure were
its  low  level of efficiency arising from  structural  imbalances and incentive problems. The
government had become aware of these problems well before the late 1  970s- It had made
13  Brada (1  989) estimates that over-staffing  in Czechoslovakian  industry was as high as
15 percent.
14  Lin (1992) estimates that  losses due to  low  incentives in the agricultural collectives
were  as much as 20 percent of total  factor  productivity.  For a theoretical model of the
monitoring problems regarding  incentives in a collective farm, see Lin (1  989a).19
several attempts to address  the structural aspect by decentralizing the allocative mechanism
from the central to the local government- However, neither the administrative nature of the
allocative mechanism  nor the pn!s-:r  environment nor the managerial  system were in any way
altered. Thus, these attempts failed to rectify  the imbalance and did not improve economic
incentives.
The goal of the 1978  reforms was also to rectify the structural imbalances  and improve
incentives. What set these reforms apart from previous attempts were the new policies which
granted a degree of autonomy to management in the state enterprises. The purpose of these
changes was to improve work incentives by allowing the managers to provide a closer link
between workers' efforts and their rewards. This shift represented only a small fissure in the
total structure. Nonetheless,  -once a crack was opened, it was pried further and further apart
and led to the eventual dismantlement of the traditional  system.
Reforms in the System of Micro-Management
The initial  motivation  for  managerial reform  was  simply to  improve the  unresponsive
quality  of  the  micro-management system  of  the  state  enterprises. Subsequently, it  has
proceeded-  through four stages. The first stage (1979-1983)  emphasized several important
experimental initiatives that were intended to enlarge enterprise autonomy and to expand the
role of financial incentives within the traditional economic structure. These measures  included
introduction  of profit retention for enterprises and performance-related bonuses  for workers.
They also permitted state enterprises to  produce more than what the state plan mandated.
Furthermore, the  enterprises involved  in exportation  were  allowed to  retain part  of their
foreign exchange earnings for use at their own  discretion.
In the second stage {1984-1986),  the  emphasis shifted to formalizing the financial20
obligations of the  state enterprises to  the government  and exposing these enterprises to
market influences. In 1983,  a tax on profits replaced profit remittances to the government.
A year later, the government allowed state enterprises to sell output in excess of plan quotas
at negotiated prices and to plan their production accordingly, thereby establishing a dual-track
price system.
During the third stage (1  987-1 992),  a contractual system was formalized and widely
adopted. It clarified the authority and responsibilities of enterprise managers. The last stage
1  993-present) attempted to introduce the modern corporate system to the state enterprises.
At each stage of reform, government intervention  has been reduced further,  and the state
enterprises have gained increasing autonomy.
The most important change in the micro-management system was the replacement of
collective farming by a household-based  system, now known as the 'household responsibility
system'.  Unlike the enterprise reforms, at the  outset the government was not seeking to
change farming institutions.  Although it had been recognized  in 1978 that solving managerial
problems within the collective system was the key to improving farmer incentives, the official
position at that time was still that the collective was to remain the basic unit of agricultural
production.
A small number of collectives began to try out the system of leasing a collective's land
and dividing the obligatory procurement quotas among individual households  in the collective.
At first, they did so secretly. Later on, it was to be with the blessing of authorities. After the
first year, these collectives were already producing yields far larger than those of other teams-
The central authorities conceded the  existence of this  new-  form  of  farming, but officially
restricted it to poor agricultural regions (mainly hilly or mountainous areas) and to the poorer
collectives whose members no longer supported them. This restriction  was ignored in most21
regions. Production performance  improved rapidly after a collective adopted  the new system,
regardless if it was a wealthier team or a poorer one.
Full official  recognition  of  the  household responsibility  system  as  a  universally
acceptable mode of farming was eventually given in late 1981, exactly two years after the
initial price increases. By that time, 45 percent of the collectives in China had already been
dismantled and replaced by more decentralized  units. By the end of 1983, 98 percent of the
agricultural collectives in China had adopted the new system.
When the household  system first appeared,  the duration of the standard  land lease  was
from one to three years.  Because  short leases reduced farmer incentive to  invest in land
improvement, in 1984 leasing contracts were  lengthened and allowed to extend up to  15
years.
The  reform of  the  micro-management system  has achieved its  intended goal  of
improving technical efficiency. Lin (1992)  estimates that  almost half of the 42.2  percent
growth  of output in the cropping sector in the  period from  1978 to  1984 was driven by
productivity changes  directly linked  to reform. Further, almost all of the growth in productivity
was attributable to the changes resulting from the introduction of the household system.
Production function  estimates in several studies have found  that  the  increase in
enterprise autonomy has also spawned productivity  increases  in the state enterprises (Chen
et al. 1988;  Gordon and Li 1989; Dollar 1990;  Jefferson et al. 1992; Groves et al. 1992).
However, the increase  in enterprise  autonomy in the context of a distorted policy environment
invited discretionary behavior from managers and workers. As expected, the profits  of the
state  enterprises declined.  The  government's  subsidies  had increased along with  the
improvement in productivity,  due to more rapid increases in wages and fringe benefits (Fan
and Schaffer 1991). Yet, once fuller autonomy had been ertended to the enterprises, it was22
politically  costly  to  revoke it.  Since the  profits  of  state  enterprises were declining, the
government's  hand was forced.  The authorities finally further increased  the autonomy of the
enterprises in the hope that they would become financially independent.
Resource  Allocation System Reform
The increase  in enterprise autonomy created pressures  to relax the system of planned
distribution. Once the state enterprises  were allowed to produce outside the parameters of
the mandatory plans, they  needed both to  obtain additional inputs  and to  sell their extra
outputs. Under pressure from them, material supplies were progressively de-linked  from the
plan, and retail commerce was gradually deregulated.  At the beginning, certain key inputs
remained under state control. Uttle  by little,  the number of regulated items was reduced.
Then, at the end of 1984, centralized credit rationing was delegated to local banks.
An unexpected effect of the relaxation of the resource allocation system was the rapid
growth of non-state enterprises, especially the township and village enterprises  (TVE). Rural
industry had existed since 1971 as a direct result of the government's decision  to mechanize
agriculture and to develop rural processing industries to in order to finance the mechanization.
In 1978 the output of TVEs consisted of 7.2 percent of the total value of industrial output in
China.  However, prior to the reforms, the growth  of TVEs was severely constrained by
limited access to credit, raw materials and markets.
The reforms created two  favorable conditions for the rapid expansion of TVEs. The
new stream of surplus created by the household system reform provided a resource  base for
new activities. The relaxation of the rigidly planned allocation system opened  up access  to key
raw materials and markets. During the period 1981-1991,  the number of TVEs, employment,
and the value of total output grew at average  annual rates of 26.6 percent, 11.2 percent and23
29.6 percent, respectively. The value of total  output for TVEs grew annually at a rate triple
that for state firms during the same  period. In 1992 TVEs' output accounted  for 32.3 percent
of the total output in China. By then, the share of industrial output by non-state enterprises
had increased  from 22 percent in 1978 to  52 percent.
The rapid entry into the economy of  non-state enterprises produced effects on the
reform process that  were  not anticipated. First of  all, non-state enterprises were closely
connected to  markets. Existing outside the  controlled system of  production, they had to
obtain raw materials and energy  from competitive markets. Their products could be sold only
in markets. Budget constraints were severe, which meant that they could not survive without
efficient  management. Their employees did  not  enjoy an "iron rice bowl'  or guaranteed
lifetime position: in a non-state enterprise, it was possible  to  be fired. As a result, the non-
state enterprises  were more  productive than the state enterprises.  The comparison  of growth
rates in output and total factor productivityr  between the state and collective sectors in Table
4 demonstrates this- The dy-iamism of non-state enterprises exerted pressure on the state
enterprises and triggered the state's decision to delegate more autonomy to the latter. The
replacement  of  profit  remittances  by  a  profit  tax,  the  establishment of  the  contract
responsibility system, and  the introduction -,f the modem corporate system were all responses
to competitive pressures.
Secondly,  the  development  of  non-state  enterprises significantly  rectified  the
misallocation  of resources. In most cases, non-state enterprises  had to pay market prices for
their inputs, and their products were sold at market prices. Price signals induced them to
adopt more labor-intensive  technologies  and  to concentrate  on small industries  which are  more24
labor-intensive. 15 In this way, the industrial structure of non-state enterprises  aligned itself
more closely with China's regional  and even international comparative advantages. The entry
of TVEs alleviated  the structural imbalances  that had been caused  by a development  strategy
focussed on heavy industry.
Table  4:  Growth  Rate of Output  and Total Factor Productivity
1980-B8  1980-84  1984-88
State  Sector
Output  8-49  6.77  10.22
TFP  2.40  1.80  3.01
Collective  Sector
OutDut  16.94  14.03  19.86
TFP;P  4-63  3.45  5.86
Source:  World  Bank  (1992),  Reform  and  Role  of the  Plan  in  the  1990s,
Washington,  D.C-
Macro-Policy  Environmental  Reform
In the traditional economic  structure, the distorted macro-policy environment was linked
most  closely to  the development strategy-  It  had on!y indirect effects on allocative and
technical efficiency. Reform  of macro-policies was the most sluggish element in the system.
Later, we will  argue that  most economic problems that  appeared  during the reforms - for
example, the boom-and-bust cycle and the rampant rent seeking  - could be attributed to the
inconsistency between the distorted policy environment and the liberalized allocation and
15 For example,  in 1  986 the average  industrial enterprise  in China  had 179.9 workers, and
the fixed investment per  worker was 7510 yuan (China  Industrial Economy  Statistical Material
1987,  p. 3). Whereas the average TVE in the same year had 28.9 workers, and the fixed
investment per worker was 1709 yuan (Statistical yearbook of China 1987. p. 205).25
enterprise  system. The Chinese government  now  faces  a dilemma: should it  make the
-macro-policy environment consistent with  the  liberalized micro-management and resource
allocation systems? Or should it  re-centralize its systems of production and distribution in
order to maintain the internal consistency of the traditional economic structure?
Depriving employees in state enterprises of  autonomy that  they have relished will
arouse resistance. A  return to  the  traditional  economic structure  would  also mean the
reappearance of economic stagnation. Thus, no matter how reluctant the government has
been to  acknowledge the diminution of the all-powerful state, the only sustainable choice
remaining has been to reform the macro-policy environment in order to align it with the new,
reformed systems of allocation and micro-management.
The changes  in the macro-policy environment started in the commodity price system.
After the introduction of profit retention, state enterprises were allowed to produce outside
the mandatory plan. The enterprises  first used an informal barter system to obtain the inputs
necessary for their 'surplus' production and to sell the extra products at premium prices. In
1984 the government introduced a dual-track price system, which allowed state enterprises
to sell output in excess of plan quotas at market prices and to plan their output accordingly.
The  dual-track price system was designed to  permit market pressures to make marginal
decisions, while retaining a measure of state control over material allocation. By 1988 only
30 percent of retail sales were still made at plan prices. State enterprises  obtained 60 percent
of their inputs and sold 60 percent of their outputs at market prices (Zou 1992).
The second major change  in the macro-environment occurred in foreign exchange rate
policy.. In the years 1979-80, the official exchange rate was roughly 1.5. yuan per US dollar.
This rate could not cover the costs of exports, since the average  cost of earning one US dollar
was around 2.5 yuan. A dual rate system was adopted at the beginning of 1981. Commodity26
trade was settled at the internal rate of 2.8 yuan per dollar; the official rate of 1  .53 yuan per
dollar continued to apply  to non-commodity transactions. After 1  985,.the yuan was gradually
devalued.
Additionally, the proportion of retained foreign exchange, which was introduc d in
1  979,  was  gradually raised. Enterprises were  allowed to  swap their  foreign exchange
entitlements with each other through the Bank of China at rates above  the official exchange
rate. Restrictions on trading foreign exchange were further relaxed  with the establishment  of
a "foreign exchange adjustment center" in Shenzhen in 1985 where enterprises  could trade
foreign exchange at negotiated rates. By the late 1  980s, similar centers had been established
in most provinces of China, and more than 80 percent of the foreign exchange  earnings  was
traded in them (Sung 1993).  The climax of foreign exchange rate policy reform was the
establishment of a managed floating system and unification of the dual rate system as of
January 1, 1994.
Interest  rate  policy  is  the  least  affected  area  of  the  traditional  macro-policy
environment. Under  the heavy industry oriented development strategy, the interest rate was
kept artificially low to f  acilitate the expansion  of capital-intensive industries. Afterthe reforms
started in 1979, the government  was forced several times to raise  both the loan  rates and  the
savings rates. 16 Still, throughout the reform process, both active and passive  interest rates
were maintained at levels far below the opportunity cost of capital.
In late 1993 the government announced  a plan to establish a development bank with
the function  of financing long-term projects at subsidized  rates and to turn the existing banks
16 To stop runs on banks, savings rates were indexed to inflation rates in October 1988.
The policy was revoked three years later. In May 1993, the interest rate for a one-year  time
deposit  was  9.18  percent. For a one-to-three-year basic investment loan, it was  10.80
percent  (China Statistics  Yearbook 1993,  pp.  670-71).  However, the  market rate for  a
commercial loan was between 15 and 25 percent.27
into commercial  banks. This reform  is expected  to take  at least three to five  years. It is
unclear whether afterwards, the interest rate will be regulated or whether it will be determined
by the  market. The biases of the heavy industry  oriented development strategy are deeply
rooted  in  the  minds  of  China's  political  leaders.  To  accelerate  the  development  of
capital-intensive industry in a capital-scarce economy, a distorted macro-policy environment
at the  very least, in the form  of  a low  interest-rate  policy  - is essential. It is likely that
administrative interventions in the financial market will linger for an extended period of time.
There have been several economic consequences of the lag between the changes in
the  allocation  system  and  in  micro-management  institutions,  and  macro-policy  re,form,
especially regarding the interest rate. The first  one was the recurrence of a boom-and-bust
cycle. Because the interest rate was maintained at ar. artificially low  level, enterprises had
incentive to obtain more credits than the supply permitted, creating unmet demand. Before
the reforms, the excess  demand  for credit was suppressed by restrictive central rationing. The
delegation of credit approval authority to  local banks in autumn of 1984  resulted in a rapid
expansion of credits and corresponding rise in investment.  As a result, the money supply
increased 49.7  percent in 1984 from  its  1983  level. This ca  sed the inflation rate to more
than double, from less than 3 percent in previous years to 8.8 percent in 1985 (see  Figure 1;.
The  government's  attempt  to  liberalize  price  controls  in  1988  further  aroused
expectations of high inflation. Because the interest rate on savings was not adjusted, panic
buying and a small-scale run on banks occurred. Loans  were maintained at the pre-determined
level. As a consequence, the money supply increased 47 percent in 1988  and the inflation
rate reached 18 percent (see Figure 1).
During  these  periods of  high  inflation,  the  economy  overheated.  Bottlenecks in
transportation,  energy,  and the  supply  of  construction  materials  appeared. Because the28
government  was reluctant  to increase  the interest  rate  as a way of checking the investment
thrust, it resorted to centralized rationing of credits and raw materials and direct control of
investment projects. In other words, it  returned to  a more disciplined system of  planned
allocation. Rationing and controls gave priority  position to  the state sectors. Inflationary
pressure  was reduced, but a bust followed.
As we saw earlier,  -although  the reforms in the micro-management  system improved
the productivity of the state sector, its deficits also rose on account of greater discretionary
behavior of the part of managers  and workers in state enterprises. Fiscal  income  increasingly
depended  on the non state sectors. During  the bust period, the growth rates of these sectors
declined because  their access  to  credits and raw materials was restricted by the austerity
program. Such a slowdown in the growth  rate became unbearable  fiscally. The state was
forced to loosen  the controls on credits and  the supply of materials,  which permitted the non-
state sectors to expand. Another boom followed- So did more conflict between the policy
environment and the liberalized  allocation and micro-management  systems.
A second consequence  of the internal inconsistency in the economic structure was
rampant rent-seeking.  After the reforms, a market price existed, legally or illegally, along  side
the set price for  almost every kind of input and commodity that the state controlled. The
difference between the market price and the planned  price was economic  rent. Estimates  of
rent-seekir.g  from the controlled  commodity prices,  interest and exchange  rates started at 200
billion yuan, about 21  .5 percent  of the national income. In 1992, the economic  rent from bank
loans alone reached 220 billion yuan (Hu 1994)*17
Non-state enterprises as well  as the  autonomous state  enterprises certainly had
1T The total credit of the state banks was 2,1 61.6 billion yuan lUS$ 248.5 billion at the
swap market  exchange rate). The difference between the official interest rate and the market
rate was about 10 percent.  The rents from bank loans alone  were as high as 216 billion yuan.29'
incentives to seeK  rents through bribes and other measures  to the state allocation  agencies.
It has been reported that under "competition", the state enterprises  in the heavy industries-
which had priority in obtaining  low-priced resources  --  also needed  to pay premiums  to banks
and other allocation agencies  in order to secure loans and materials  earmarked  for them, or
to obtain them promptly.
Because  of rent-seeking,  state enterprises  were often unable  to obtain the credits and
materials  promised  in the plans. Rent-seeking  also caused widespread  public resentment and
became  a source of social instability. To guarantee the survival of the state enterprises  and
to  curb social resentment, the govemment attempted to  re-institute tight controls on the
allocation system in the austerity programs  of 1986 and 1988. These controls were relaxed
later  on to  permit the  growth  of  the  non-state sectors.  Except for  the  interest rate,
administrative controls on the prices of most materials and cormmodities  have now been
removed-
1Ill.  COMPARISON  OF APPROACHES  TO REFORM
There has been  much discussion  of the reasons  why China's reforms have been  more
successful  than those in Eastern  Europe  and the former Soviet Union (Chen  et al. 1992; Qian
and Xu  1993; Harrold 1992;  McMillan and Naughton 1992;  Gelb et .al- 1993; McKinnon
1993).  Other than the desirability of gradualism, studies have emphasized  China's initial
structure (its large  agricultural  sector) and  the factthat its economy  is decentralized  by region.
If China's success  was mainly the result of initial conditions which are unique  to China,  then
it holds no general implications for other economies  where initial conditions may be different30
(Sachs and Woo, 19931.
Our investigation points to a different conclusion.  The economic  problems  in pre-reforrn
China  should be common  to all socialist economies since  they all adopted a similar economic
development  strategy and because  they all have similar macro-policy  environments, planned
allocation systems and puppet-like state enterprises. Empirical  evidence shows that, as in
pre-reform China, Eastern European and Soviet economies were over-industrialized  with
gigantic state enterprises;  their service sectors and light industries  were underdeveloped  and
employee  incentives were low (Newbery  1993; Brada  and King,  1991; Sachs  and  Woo, ':9931.
For an economy with a given stock of resources, the point of greatest efficiency in the
production plan is point E. However, under a heavy industry oriented  development  strategy,
the actual production point is B,  as illustrated in Figure  3. "Shock  therapy' attempts to reform
the economic structure so that the given stock of resources  can be utilized more efficiently.
Diagrammatically, the  reforms attempt  to  move production  from  point  B  to  point  E.
Stabilization, liberalization  and privatization are necessary  conditions for achieving  this goal.
This is because  to induce economic agents to move from point B to point E voluntarily, the
agents: (11 must expect that tne  economy will  remain stable; (2) need to  have correct
relative-price  signals; and (3) should have the incentives to responc;  to the price signals.  The
prescription of stabilization, price liberalization and privatization is internally consistent. This
scheme  is equivalent  to the replacement  of the whole traditional economic  structure as  shown
in Figure 2.
If the  reforms were free of  transaction  costs, "shock therapy" would enable the
economy to jump from point B directly to point E. This movement is traced by the dotted line
in Figure 4A.  However, some fixed  equipment  in heavy industries cannot be used for
production in light industries; for other equipment, modifications are required  for  new uses31
(Brada and  King, 1991).  Workers in heavy industry  also need retraining before they  can be
assigned  to new jobs. Moreover, the establishment  of new market institutions  takes time and
resources  (Murrel and Wang, 1993;  Lin I 989b).  Therefore,  during the initial stage of reforms,
an  increase  in lighit industry  cannot  compensate  for the  decline in heavy  industry.  Thus,
instead  of moving directly from point B to point E, the economy moves first from B to F before
reaching  E. The resulting  path of growth  in GNP is a J-curve,  as shown  in Figure 4B.
How large the  decline in GNP will be  and  how long it will take  before the arrival of
recovery  can  only  be  determined  empirically. The  experiences  of Eastern  Europe and  the
former Soviet Union (quantified in Table 1) suggest  that  the decline can consume  more than
50  percent  of GNP and that  it will take  several  years  before the arrival of a turning point. A
govemment-is  certain to confront a legitimacy crisis when the short-term  results of reform are
simultaneously  so dramatic and so negative  (Dewatripont  and Roland, 19921. The leadership
may not  be  able to  hold onto  a  consensus  concerning  the  course  of further  reforms,  and
political instability is likely to follow. Instead of a J-curve,  the  result of 'shock  therapy'  may
forrn a huge  L-curve.
When  China started  its  reforms  in the  late  1970s,  the  political leadership  did  not
question  the feasibility or desirability of the traditional  economic structure.  Its intention was
simply to improve incentives  in the state  enterprises  and collective farms  by giving agents  a
degree  of autonomy  so that a closer link between  individual effort and personal reward could
be established.  The attempt  was to  move from  point B to point A in Figure 5A.
More  autonomy  on  the  micro-level  represented  only  a  modest  alteration  in  the
traditional  economic  structure,  yet  it had  far-reaching  consequences.  The  unanticipated
results  of the micro-management  reforms  are that  the autonomous  entrepreneurs,  who are
driven by profit motivation,  allocated  the new  flow of resources  under their control to the32
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more profitable suppressed  sectors.
Since the planned allocation system and distorted  macro-policy environment were
preserved, the state retained control over the earlier flow of resources and guaranteed  that
these would be allocated to  the priority  sectors. In our diagram, the economy follows a
dynamic path from point A to a point close to G, instead of to H (see Figure 5A). Throughout
the  reform  process, the  economy enjoyed  continuous  growth,  as shown  in Figure 5B.
Moreover, as the economy grew, the proportion of resources  that was allocated according  to
the planned prices became increasingly smaller- By the time the price for a commodity was
liberalized,  the shock was much smaller  than the gap between the market price and plan price
would have suggested."
If the above description is a reasonable  analysis of the reason why China  was able to
enjoy continuous economic growth during the reform process, we can expect the following-
First, the  expansion of  the suppressed sectors does not result in a decline in the priority
sectors because it is supported by a new flow  of resources. Second, the economy should
reach a higher rate of economic growth than the pre-reform rate because the new flow of
resources has been allocated to the more efficient sectors.
Both assertions are confirmed by the empirical evidence- Table 5 shows the number
of  workers in each sector of the economy from  1978 to  1992. These numbers increased
throughout the whole period except for agricultural labor in 1984 and in 1992. Even  in those
two  years,  the agricultural labor force  declined less than  one percent. The increase in
employment in the  agricultural and  non-agricultural sectors was supported by the  new
The official exchange rate was 5.7 yuan for 1 US dollar. The swap market rate was 8.7
yuan for 1 US dollar when the exchange rate in China was unified with the market swap rate
at the beginning of 1  994. However, the shock of unification was not large since beforehand
about 80 percent of foreign exchange had already been traded in the swap markets.34
additional labor force.
Thus, the rapid growth of rural industries and other sectors of the economy was not
because  of the transfer  of workers  from the  state  sectors  to the non state  sectors.  Nor was
the rapid economic  growth  due to the transfer  of labor from the  low productivity  agriculture
to  higher productivity  industries,  as claimed  by Sachs  and Woo (1993).  Table 6 reports  the
growth  rates  in national income in selected  sectors.  As expected,  the  annual growth  rate  in
each  sector  accelerated.  In addition,  the state  industrial  sector  had  a positive  growth  rate,
though  below  that  which  it enjoyed  prior to  reform. This  is also  anticipated  by our model.35
Table  5:  Labor  Force  in Selective  Sectors
(unit=million)
Year  Agriculture  Industrv  Construction  Transportation  Commerce
State  Non-state
*  1978  283.73  31i39  29.52  8-75  7.35  11.55
1979  286592  32.08  30.90  9.43  7.65  12.48
- . 1980  291.81  33.34  33.80  10.22  7.87.  13.81.
*  1981  298.36  34.88  34.87  10.58  8.24  15.11
1982  309.17  35.82  36.22  11.73  8.50  16.04
1983  312.09  36.32  37.65  13.14  9.07  17.62
1984  309.27  36.69  42.67  16.92  10.81  20.36
1985  311.87  38.15  45.34  20.69  12.22  23.63
1986  313.11  39.55  50.25  22.71  13.05  24.85
1987  317.20-  40.86  52.57  24.19  13.73  26.55
1988  323.08  42.29  54.32  25.27  14.34  28.29
1989  332.84  42.73  52.95  24.44  14.32  28.60
1990  341.77  43.64  53.33  24.61  14.69  29.37
1991  350.16  44.72  54.75  25.21  15.15  31.00
1992  348.55  45.21  56.98  27.02  15.73  33.12
Source:  China  Statistical  Yearbook,  1993,  p.  98.  and p.107
Table  6:  Index  and  Growth  Rate  of National  Income  in Selective  Sectors
Year  Total  Agriculture  Industrvy'  Construction  Transportation  Commerce
Total  State
Index  (1952=100)
1952  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
1978  453.4  161.2  1438.9  3345.3  573.5  546.9  296.4
1992  1473.2  332.9  7011.2  9825.7  2455.0  18B8.5  749.2
Average  Annual  Growth  Rate  (percent)
1952-78  6.0  1.9  10.8  14.S  6.9  .6  *8  4.3
1978-92  8.8  5.3  13.2  8.0  10.9  9.2  6.9
Source:  China  Statistical  Yearbock,  1993,  p.  34 and  p.  413.
Note:  *Gross  value  of industrial  output  measured  at constant  prices.36
IV. CONCLUDING  REMARKS.
Although Chinese  leaders  did not have a detailed blueprint in mind when they initiated
the process of  reform, -the discussion in this  paper suggests that  China's reforms have
followed a path which can be explained  by the theory of induced institutional innovation (Lin
1  989b, North 1  990). The traditional economic structure was itself a product of institutional
innovation linked  to a development  strategy emphasizing  heavy industry. This earlier  structure
was a vehicle for mobilizing resources  to  build up priority sectors. However, its economic
efficiency was low.
Once the integrity of the traditional  economic structure was compromised by the
introduction of enterprise autonomy, results playing out over a number of years forced the
replacement of the traditional structure with a more  efficient market structure. In the process,
the efficiency  of state enterprises was improved as they became more autonomous and
started to confront competition from the non-state sectors. The dynamism of the economy
originated in the swift entry of new, small non-state enterprises.  The older planned  allocation
system and distorted macro-policy environment gradually became unsustainable  and were
discarded  in the face of challenges  from non-state enterprises  as well as  from the autonomous
state enterprises.
During the reform process, the state, the enterprises and the population have had
sufficient time to make  adjustments to the new market structure. The majority benefits from
the reforms  because  the economy has maintained strong growth  throughout the  whole
process.
The "big bang" approach  in Eastern  Europe  and the former Soviet Union  also attempts
to replace an inefficient structure with a more efficient market structure.  Privately-owned37
small firms  emerged immediately after the  lifting  of the  ban on private enterprise. The
privatization of medium  and large-scale  state enterprises  has  been  prolonged  and is proceeding
slowly (Murrel and Wang, 1993; Wang 1993). This mix of private and state-owned  enterprise
is in fact similar to what happened  in China after gradual reform. However, China's  approach
did not  disrupt production in the state sectors.  Thus, its gradualism achieved the same
positive effects as the "big bang" approach, but was able to avoid its  costs.  If transaction
costs and the path-dependence  of institutional changes are taken into account, it can be
argued  that China's gradual  approach  is both theoretically and empirically  superior  to the "big
bang' approach.
Until now, most of the elements  in China's reform process  were not explicitly designed
in advance  of their implementation.  Rather,  they were induced. However, the experience  of
China's reforms may provide a useful lesson  for designing  reform  policies in other economies
in  which  a  heavy  industry  oriented strategy  has  been adopted under capital-scarce
conditions.' 9 Certainly, because  the stage of development, the endowment structure, the
political system, and the cultural heritage are different from one country to another, the
specific design and sequence  of  reforms in an economy should be "induced'  rather than
'imposed."  With  this  caveat in mind, in  addition to  the  general advice of  maintaining
economic  and political stability, the following lessons may be useful for a government with
an economy having an economic  structure similar to that of pre-reform China:
*  In  essence, a  strategy emphasizing heavy  industry  is  one  that  attempts  rapid
development. The government  allows the distortion of the macro-policy environment  in order
to facilitate the advance  of some  industries  that exceed  the stage  of development  dictated by
the comparative advantages  of the economy's resource structure. The import-substitution
strategy widely adopted  in Latin America is another example  of this same  rapid development
strategy.38
1.  Grant autonomy to the micro-management  units which will improve the incentive
structure and create a new flow  of resources.
2.  Allow  autonomous enterprises  to allocate this new flow of resources  to the suppressed
sectors while maintaining  priority sectors.
3.  Reform  gradually a distorted policy environment and planned  allocation system in order
to make them consistent with newly-autonomous  enterprises 20.
20  The opportunity cost for workers to  move from the state-sectors to the non-state
sectors may be higher  in Eastern  Europe  and  the former Soviet Union  (EEIFSU)  than in China.
The reason  for this is that the subsidies  to workers were higher  and the economies  were more
decentralized in EEIFSU  than in China, as Sachs and Woo (1993) and Oian and Xu (1  993)
have correctly emphasized.  However, higher  opportunity cost is not a sufficient condition for
nullifying the applicability of the Chinese approach. In China the differences between the
state-regulated prices and those of the market were generally less  than 30 percent (and at
most 100 percent) before the reforms. The differences  for many commodities  in EEIFSU  often
reached as much as 10 times. Therefore, the expected costs for a worker to move from the
state-sector to  the  non state sector will  be much higher in EEtFSU  than in China. The
existence  of a large  secondary  economy  in EElFSU  before  the reforms  suggests  that resources
would have quickly flown into the suppressed  sectors if the activities had been legalized.39
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